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Abstract 
Roland Bal analyzes the strategies his research group developed to deal with the interlinked 
dynamics of research evaluation in a multi-disciplinary institutional environment characteristic 
of much STS research. Scholars in such environments constantly need to navigate and negotiate 
the standards of evaluation, in complex choreographies of cooperation and competition with 
other disciplinary groups. Bal describes strategies his group has successfully used, and how these 
strategies have both shifted the way research quality is assessed within the department as well as 
changed the way his group works and publishes. In conclusion, he describes performance 
management systems and research practices as co-constituted and calls for a debate on which 
forms of evaluation infrastructures allow for better ways of doing research in STS. 
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Introduction 
Somewhat in a hurry and sweaty—I just came out of a meeting and had to cycle fast to be on time 
on an Indian summer day in 2007—I enter the Dean’s office. Present are the Dean of the Medical 
School and the vice-Dean of the Department of Health Policy and Management, where I am 
employed. I sit down and thankfully accept a glass of water. On the agenda is whether the Dean 
can accept the advice made by the appointment committee of the chair of Healthcare Governance 
to appoint me, an STS scholar gone healthcare governance, as a professor. After some chitchat, 
the Dean briefly looks at a small piece of paper in front of him. Slightly nodding his head the 
Dean confirms that I can be appointed. Later, I learn from the vice-Dean that on the list are the 
names and ages of the candidates for the professorship, alongside the number of papers in 
international (that is: English language) peer reviewed journals they have published. 
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By that time I was already accustomed to, embedded within and, yes, implicated in, a 
research tradition that puts the quantity of publications first. Coming from a humanities 
background, my first personal encounter with this tradition was during my first interview for an 
assistant professor position at the same department. At the time it was made clear that my 
publication list was not fitting with the departments’ aims. The types of output on the list—e.g. 
many publications in Dutch, book chapters and other types of publications—simply did not 
count here. Later, I learned that this assessment was not just a reflection of a research tradition 
that I had not experienced before in this manner, but was in fact institutionalized to high degrees. 
The allocation of departmental research funding, for example, was completely based on 
publication output by the different research groups—health economics, health insurance, medical 
sociology, health law, health policy and management—and promotion policies were largely 
based on this as well (although other factors, such as teaching, visibility in the department and 
policy impact were not excluded). However, while there were clear differences with the tradition 
I came from, I also came to learn that those are largely differences in degree. For example, while 
doing research and publishing in my previous work setting was as much a collective effort, this 
collectivity was simply represented in different ways—e.g. collaborators were mentioned in the 
acknowledgements rather than as co-authors. 
Of course, my experience is not unique. Many STS scholars work in academic contexts 
that are strange to STS itself. In fact, in a sense STS never had a “home of its own” and apart from 
some groups spread across the globe (but mostly in Northern Europe and the USA) STS scholars 
find themselves working in many different academic environments and traditions. This is not just 
because of the somewhat parasitic nature of STS—building on the work of other sciences and 
increasingly other types of practices—but often also an explicit strategy in trying to intervene in, 
or at least work with, alongside, or against other disciplines or practices. Thus STS scholars can 
be found in many science departments, but also increasingly in the social sciences or in policy 
research institutes.  Given that all these disciplines have other ways of assessing performance and 
that career paths within all these disciplines differ2, what does this mean for STS researchers? 
How do “we” adjust to all these different accountability contexts? In this paper I want to account 
for my (or rather “our,” as this is always a collective effort) strategies in dealing with becoming 
part of a “strange” scholarly context, focusing specifically on how we have dealt with the system 
of performance management in which we have become embedded. I will focus on three such 
strategies of being implicated in the indicator game: changing the system, adjusting to the 
system, and ignoring the system. 
This paper, besides analyzing our practices and strategies in an “auto-ethnography,” is 
also somewhat of a discussion with those authors that take indicator systems as all-
encompassing, stressing the disciplinary powers and tight couplings of indicators and the ways 
in which they are embedded within organizations (Sauder and Espeland 2009, Lorenz 2008). 
Indicator systems, as this tale will exemplify, always have overflows, and status or performance 																																																								
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assessment is never just one thing, but somewhat of a negotiated order between official 
performance management systems and the practices in which they are assumed to work and in 
which often different evaluation schemes are at play at the same time. That is, interactions 
between evaluation systems (plural), work contexts (again plural) and institutional work 
performed by those working within those contexts all get mingled up in how performance 
assessments can work and what consequences they produce. As performance assessment systems 
become parts of practices, their effects are thus always contingent on the dynamics of those 
practices in relation to several evaluation schemes that are part of those practices. But, before 
delving into the ways in which we tried to play with indicators, let me first bring you a little 
further into our world. 
 
 
Research Funding in the Netherlands 
Universities in the Netherlands have a complicated financial structure. In general, three money 
streams are distinguished, the first of which is direct funding from the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science. This first money stream is divided between the universities mainly on the 
basis of the amount of students and bachelor and master diplomas, as well as the amount of 
PhDs granted. After capping for university services and policies, universities divide this money 
between faculties. All universities have different ways of doing this, but again the amount of 
students and diplomas (including PhDs) is the dominant factor. The second money stream is also 
government money, but it is distributed to the universities in competition, mainly through 
research grants distributed by the Dutch Science Foundation (in Dutch: NWO). NWO money 
does not pay for all costs, so some form of matching is usually required. The third money stream, 
then, is contract research for private or public organizations and industries.3 Research money 
from European grants (e.g. the framework programs or Horizon 2020) is also often defined as 
part of the third money stream. Contract research does usually cover all costs of research and 
sometimes allows for some profits. 
In our department and group, the first money stream accounts for about half of the funding, 
and half of that is meant for teaching. The remaining half of first money stream money was until 
recently (see below) completely distributed over the different groups on the basis of research 
output. Three indicators were used for this: the amount of PhDs granted in each group, the share 
of each group in the total amount of second money stream funding, and publication points, for 
which an elaborate system was—and still is—in place.  
When I arrived at the department, more than half of the research money went to one of the 
then seven groups: the health economists. Not only had this group developed the strongest 
research culture and infrastructure, it also benefitted immensely from the way in which research 
money was distributed, which was mainly based on the amount of publications in high impact 
journals. Below, I analyze the three strategies that we as a group of mainly STS and public 																																																								
3 In medical research, often a fourth money stream is distinguished, which is money from patient funds. Our 
department doesn’t make this distinction. 
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administration scholars focusing on processes of governance in healthcare have followed to cope 
with this situation:4 changing the system (of research money distribution), adapting to the system, 
and ignoring the system. 
 
 
Changing the System 
A first strategy that we used was trying to change the system of performance management within 
the department. Just after I was appointed as professor a first opportunity for this arose, when 
the performance management system was reviewed by the board of the department (of which I 
was a member at that time). Given the uneven distribution of research money within the 
department, we focused on the necessity of keeping inter-disciplinarity in the department alive, 
meaning that all groups should at least have some research funding. Within the then existing 
system, especially the health law group—focusing very much on books and publications in 
Dutch—came out badly, but other groups were suffering as well (my group in fact did not do that 
bad, but clearly underperformed in relation to the economists, and produced a lot of “invisible” 
work). Whilst the performance management system produced competition between the groups—
a value that was highly regarded, not in the least by the health economists, whose views were 
dominant—collaboration between the groups was also seen to be an essential condition for the 
survival of the department as a whole; first, because mixed methods and multi-disciplinary 
approaches became more fashionable in health services research, but also because most of the 
first money stream is in fact dependent on teaching and here multi-disciplinary approaches 
prevailed in our programs. Taking up these broader goals we succeeded in getting a discussion 
of the performance management system, which initially lead to some smaller changes. For 
example, publications in some Dutch journals that were peer reviewed were now counted, and 
under specific conditions—they had to be peer reviewed, a list of top publishers was introduced 
and there could never be higher points than the highest scoring paper—books and book chapters 
were included in the system as well.  
The biggest change, however, concerned journal articles. Here we joined forces with 
some of the other groups, especially the health insurance people that were coming out badly in 
the existing system as well, to plea for relative journal impact factors (JIF) instead of absolute 
ones.5 Moreover, the amount of words of a paper was taken up in the performance management 
system, to prevent publication slicing but also because longer papers (up to a 9,000 word limit) 
were thought to have a higher impact; the argument that journals have sometimes much lower 
word limits was easily tackled by showing that e.g. the British Medical Journal (word limit 2,400) 
often published papers of up to 9,000 words. The new system thus allowed for a better fit 
between the performance management system of the Department and the diverging research and 
publication practices of the groups that make up the Department. With the new system in place, a 																																																								
4 Of course, strategy is a strong word for something that I can now retrospectively see has emerged over 
time, but probably this is just what strategy is (Jarzabkowski, Balogun, and Seidl 2007). 
5 Using the absolute JIF, medical but also economics journals scored much higher than social science 
journals, but under the relative JIF this disappears as the JIF is now calculated per scientific field. 
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more even distribution of the research money was reached, although some groups, including 
health law, still “underperformed.”  
The financial crisis, which hit the department hard from 2010 onwards, gave a further 
window of opportunity to change the performance management system. As the financial crisis 
mainly hit the second and (partly) the third money stream, it became clear that some groups now 
had very little leeway to do research. Using the argument that most of the first stream money was 
distributed by the ministry on the basis of the amount of teaching, and that in order to do good 
teaching, some research was necessary—and again referring to the inter-disciplinarity of the 
department and especially its teaching programs—we were able to diminish the part of the 1st 
money stream research money that was distributed on the basis of the performance management 
system. Now, not half, but a quarter is distributed this way, whereas the other quarter is 
distributed on the basis of the relative share of teaching in our bachelor and master programs—
also adding an incentive to teach. By performing institutional work (Wallenburg, Quartz, and Bal 
2016) and aligning with some of the other groups, we were thus able to creatively negotiate new 
performance arrangements. We helped to create a new “incentive structure” for the department 
in which at least some of the work that was invisible before (Dutch publications, teaching) now 
became more important, thus creating more leeway for such kinds of work. 
We didn’t succeed in all our efforts, of course, especially as the “incentivization” of 
research through output measures was still seen as a way forward, mainly by our economists. 
Nevertheless, reframing the relation between the groups in the department as a combination of 
competition and collaboration—mainly through the increased need for inter-disciplinarity in 
both research and teaching contexts—other valuations could be made more legitimate as a basis 
for research money distribution. Moreover, by then we as a group had proven to perform well 
within the “incentivized” structure by adapting to the system, which gave some credibility to our 
arguments. 
 
 
Adapting to the System 
Apart from changing the system to come to a more even distribution of research money, we also 
changed our own research and publication practices, learning from the research culture in the 
health economics group, but also adjusting our practices to the performance management system, 
which also reflects broader institutional patterns in research evaluation. This strategy of 
adaptation is well documented in the indicator literature under the heading of the performativity 
of evaluation systems (Weingart 2005, Hicks et al. 2015). For example, while at least some of the 
PhD theses in the group were still written in the form of Dutch language monographs, we 
changed to a system in which PhD theses had to be based on international journal articles, 
especially for students who want to pursue an academic career.6 Moreover, we stimulated 																																																								
6 Next to those, we actually do quite some supervisory work for “external” PhD students, mostly late career 
health professionals and managers; for those students, international publications are less important as they 
want to intervene in practical rather that academic discussions and Dutch language monographs for those 
students are still prevalent. 
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multiple authorships by redefining the research paper as a “project,” for which project teams 
were assigned on the basis of the expertise needed to write particular papers. Targeting higher 
impact journals (within, but also outside our own direct fields, such as health services research) 
we were able to substantially increase our research output in terms of the performance 
management system.  
Embedded within those changes were both individual and group logics—PhD students 
pursuing academic careers clearly were at an advantage when publishing papers rather than 
monographs (at least in the Dutch system where personal grants in the second money stream are, 
for example, highly based on research output in terms of English-language journal papers), and 
supervisors and co-writers of papers were rewarded for their work in this way; for the group as a 
whole it meant that paper production could be stimulated, leading to higher scores in the 
performance management system, which got us a larger share of first stream research money. 
 These changes did not go without friction in the group, however, and there were many 
discussions about, for example, single authorship. Pointing at publication practices within, for 
example, STS and public administration, some group members favored at least the possibility of 
single-authored papers. Also, there were discussions about the extent to which members of the 
group (or outsiders) had to be involved in the writing of papers to “earn” authorship, including 
discussion of the “added value” of such contributions. And in some thesis defense committees 
there were questions by scholars from these fields about what the candidate had exactly 
contributed to the research given that, except for the introduction and conclusion of the thesis, 
papers often were co-authored.  
To accommodate the internal discussion, we formed guidelines for authorship, based on 
international guidelines in the social sciences and paying special attention to the position of PhD 
students—e.g. promoting that they write papers with others than only their supervisors and 
stipulating that PhD students write at least one single authored paper towards the end of their 
PhD. In addition, we created room for members of the group to work on single-authored 
publications by providing budgets. Changes in publication practices in fields such as STS and 
public administration also worked to reduce discussion. Multiple authorship in core journals in 
those fields has become more common, possibly showing similar tendencies in other groups 
across the world. As a result, discussions we had just a few years ago are now less heated. 
 Moreover, as part of the reorganization necessitated by the financial crisis, we went 
through a process of designing a more substantive research strategy, defining themes for research 
and target academic fields. With this, we tried to establish a more coherent identity for the group 
in order to facilitate teamwork on projects and publications, enabling researchers that hadn’t 
collaborated in the past to take this up.  For example, people working on task differentiation in 
healthcare practice and on concentrations of care now could collaborate on a more overarching 
theme of the “re-placing” of care (Oldenhof, Postma, and Bal 2016), and work on clinical 
guidelines, performance indicators and evaluation of “complex interventions” in healthcare 
could now be conceptualized under the overarching theme of “valuation and experimentation.” 
Such a more thematic approach helped in fostering new collaborations within the group but also 
allowed for more visibility of the groups’ academic contribution within and outside the 
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department, allowing us also to target more high-impact journals. Defining the core disciplines 
that we wanted to contribute to (i.e. STS, organization science and public administration) also 
helped in creating a clearer identity for the group, for example, in choosing which conferences to 
attend and what journals to aim for, which also helped PhD students to have a clearer academic 
focus. This of course also meant that some themes and publics fell of the table; e.g. the groups’ 
earlier work in medical informatics (e.g. Pirnejad et al. 2009) has now been sidelined. Such 
redefinitions also allowed for new collaborations with policy actors, which brings me to our third 
strategy. 
 
 
Ignoring the System 
Until now, it might seem that in our research strategies we focused very much on the 
performance management system—either trying to change it to better represent our research 
practices, or adjusting those practices to make for a better match to the system. But this is only 
part of the story. Our third strategy was one in which we in fact tried to ignore the system. There 
are two reasons for this. First, the performance management system is only concerned with the 
1st money stream, and as mentioned before, this accounts for only about half of the budget for 
the group––and, as other money streams are almost exclusively research money, only a third of 
the total amount of research budget. The 2nd and 3rd money stream are therefore much more 
important for the research in the group. And for these money streams, academic output in terms 
of international peer reviewed publications is important to a lesser extent.7 In fact, the reputation 
of the group in doing policy-relevant research is much more important, as is the visibility for the 
group in Dutch health policy. Being active in policy debates, serving on policy committees, 
publishing in Dutch health policy journals—activities that are not rewarded in the performance 
management system—are all much more important than international publications in this regard 
(even though these help to settle the academic reputation of the group). While such work is not 
part of the performance management system, the department actually does value its visibility in 
the healthcare domain and many researchers—also from other groups—are active in advising 
policymakers of all sorts.8 The institutional context thus also gave us the space to further this 
strategy. 
 Secondly, in terms of research strategy, we are interested in doing “interventionist” 
research (see e.g. Bal and Mastboom 2007, Zuiderent-Jerak et al. 2009). Again, this means that 
engagement with the publics we are trying to establish is important—i.e. working with and 
publishing for health professionals, health policy makers, healthcare organizations, patient 
groups, etc. As part of the strategy to deal with the financial crisis, for example, we set up longer-																																																								
7 For the 2nd money stream, only in rare occasions do the quality and quantity of publications really count. 
This is the case especially for individual funds. For programs that we usually target, the reputation of the 
group is much more important and this is only partly established through publications (although of course 
not publishing does not help here).  
8 In fact, in studying health policymaking in the Netherlands, it is very hard to miss researchers from the 
department (e.g. see Zuiderent-Jerak and van Egmond 2015 for an analysis of the work of researchers from 
the department in making a healthcare “market” in the Netherlands). 
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term partnerships with some of the key actors in the Dutch health policy sector, such as the 
healthcare inspectorate and the National Healthcare institute, in the form of academic 
collaboratives, which we had also studied in the context of public health policies in the 
Netherlands (Wehrens, Bekker, and Bal 2014); we also including endowed professorships within 
the group. Whilst for other groups within the department it is not uncommon to have such 
longer term collaboration, the extent to which we pursued this strategy as well as its focus on 
practice-based research is more uncommon and we had to go through some departmental 
discussions to secure those collaborations and be able to appoint the endowed professors, which 
all came from the external partners. Working with the core regulators in Dutch healthcare 
certainly helped in this regard, as their standing comes undisputed. Also, involving researchers 
from the other groups as well as from external academic groups has given us some leeway. 
Showing the success of these collaborations—both in terms of research output and practical 
impact—of course was also essential in order to secure continuation. While such forms of 
research collaboration also allow for academic output that is recognized within the performance 
management system, much of this research actually is focused on more specific issues and 
themes relevant to Dutch policymakers and is published in Dutch language reports and 
presented at policy meetings. Rather than focusing on academic output alone, such work thus is 
more relational and substantively oriented. 
 As Ruth Müller argues in her contribution to this thematic collection (Müller 2017), such 
a strategy comes with a cost, as it means playing on two (or more) boards: hitting the target of the 
performance management system and engaging in public discussions. At the individual level, 
such a price might be too hard to pay. At the group level—especially when successful in raising 
extra funding—it becomes much more doable and even a fruitful strategy in terms of the kinds of 
interventionist research strategies we pursue while also allowing for individual researchers to 
(temporarily) focus on academic or policy contexts. While acknowledging that people have 
different talents, we try to stimulate all members of the group to do both types of work. This is 
also connected to the kinds of interventions we pursue, which are often more conceptual in 
nature, albeit with strong practical impact—e.g. building on the heterogeneity of policy and 
regulatory practices to stimulate processes of “exnovation” (Mesman 2011) and experimentation 
(Winthereik and Jensen 2016). Moreover, such a strategy also, at least in part, allows us to work 
with another big concern with the “projectification” of research (Felt, 2017), as longer-term 
relationships with policy actors allow us to formulate more strategic research agendas. For 
example, within the context of the work with the healthcare inspectorate we have been able to 
formulate an agenda on the “experimentalist” nature of governance, studying different 
valuations of health(care) in the context of regulation whilst also helping the inspectorate to deal 
with issues of uncertainty in regulation. 
 
 
Conclusions 
Performance management and evaluation are increasingly seen as “machines” that create the 
very practices they are evaluating (Dahler-Larsen 2013), in the sense that they constitute the 
Roland Bal  Engaging Science, Technology, and Society 3 (2017) 
 	
	 49 
criteria in which those practices come to define and organize themselves. In the research field, 
this has amounted to a literature arguing that research is increasingly transformed to match up 
with the evaluation criteria defined in the (biomedical and physical) sciences, such as the journal 
impact factor (Hicks et al. 2015). In this paper I have set out to analyze the ways in which we, as a 
group of STS researchers, have tried to cope with such a performance management system within 
an inter-disciplinary context.  
From this analysis, a couple of things become clear. First, while we were certainly 
“implicated in the indicator game” this didn't mean that the performance management system 
was dictating the way we have organized our research practices. Rather than just adapting to the 
performance management system, we have also been active in changing the system to make it 
better represent the kinds of research we are engaged in, using the multi- and inter-disciplinary 
environment of the department to change the system from within. In this sense, performance 
management systems do not so much seem to constitute research practices, but are also 
constituted by them, making the relation between evaluation and practical work much more into 
a process of co-constitution (Jensen 2011). What helped here was that the institutional context in 
which we work might be more prone to intervention, as the performance management system is 
made at the departmental rather than faculty or university level, and that the department has a 
tradition of doing policy-relevant research. Nevertheless, changing the system required 
considerable work in reframing the valuation practices in the department.  
Secondly, although the performance management system certainly was and is relevant to 
the way we organize our research practice, working around the system is maybe even more 
important for the academic work that we do—not only in terms of money flows but also in terms 
of our more substantive and methodological approaches, i.e. doing research that is engaged with 
and intervening in (Dutch) health policy. In this type of research, alternative evaluation 
mechanisms come to the fore, allowing us also to build our own informal systems of performance 
management, e.g. by engaging in academic collaboratives in which policy-relevant research and 
research output in terms of presentations to and publication for the groups we engage with 
become more important. While such research can also sometimes be translated back to the more 
prevalent evaluation schemes, by producing academic publications, it allows for much more 
variation in terms of output that “counts.” It also allows for a mixing of what Paradeise and 
Thoenig (2013, cited Wouters 2017) describe as evaluations in terms of “reputation” and 
“excellence,” thus allowing for a richer description of research practice. 
In this sense, our entanglements with performance management can also be described as 
“experimental” (Winthereik and Jensen 2016), in that the processes we went through are also 
forms of trying to develop standards that are relevant to the work we do while at the same time 
coping with the performance management system that is part of our institutional setting. While 
being implicated, we were thus also in a sense able to “play with” the performance game—
sometimes being bound by its rules, sometimes bending or ignoring them. This should not be 
seen as easy game, though, as sometimes the different strategies might—and do—clash, and it 
does involve playing different games at the same time. So, yes, more sweaty meetings were 
involved. 
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While this short auto-ethnography of our research strategies is specific to the research 
environment in which we are embedded—i.e. the particularities of the Dutch research system 
and the inter-disciplinary environment of our work—it does show that playing the indicator 
game is in practice much more multifaceted than often assumed in the literature on research 
evaluation. In that sense it calls for much more practice-based research on how such performance 
management systems interact with research practices (see e.g. Rushforth and de Rijcke 2015). 
Such research might ask how infrastructures for evaluation and research are built alongside each 
other and what types of research become possible (or not) within those co-evolving 
infrastructures. At least, this would allow for a much more pluriform strategy of doing 
research—and evaluating it. 
STS as a field both has to deal with the inherent tensions in research evaluation and can 
build on it. Many STS groups find themselves in settings similar to ours, albeit under different 
institutional conditions. Sharing how we deal with the tensions involved—to which this thematic 
collection is a first attempt—can help us in creating new strategies to pursue our research 
agendas in sometimes hostile (but often also friendly) contexts. Research evaluation is, of course, 
also an important area of STS research in itself and insights from these studies can (and are) used 
to change existing evaluation systems. As research evaluation is now also hotly discussed within 
the sciences themselves (see e.g. the San Francisco declaration and Hicks et al. 2015) there is some 
momentum to perform the institutional work described in this paper on a larger scale. 
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